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INTRODUCTION: AN ODYSSEY AND AN AWAKENING
In 1985 I was convicted for a robbery related homicide. I wish I could
say that it wasn’t me, that they picked the wrong person out of the lineup, or that I had nothing to do with the actual shooting, but I can’t. The
minute I picked up a gun with the thought that a robbery would somehow
rid me of my drug dependent lifestyle was the minute I became the coward
who would end up taking someone’s life. I received an eighteen years to
life sentence and before I knew it, I was in Attica Correctional Facility. I
was a twenty-three-year-old unskilled high school graduate who had
never been incarcerated. I didn’t know how I would make it to see the
next day, let alone the next eighteen years. All I had was the present, “one
day at a time.”
Prison is a world in and of itself. It is designed to break the human
spirit. Yet, strangely, there was a familiarity about prison that I didn’t expect. Sure, the constant threat of cell bars, prison guards, and gun towers
were all new and intimidating, but the sense that there was no way out
and the constant threat of violence were, in many respects, no different
than where I grew up in the Bronx. Many of us came from the same neighborhoods, same families, and formed the same gangs. Drugs were readily
friends at Parole Preparation Project, namely Michelle Lewin, Nora Carroll, and Andrea Bible.
I cannot forget about Professor Steve Zeidman of City of University New York Law School
who presented this paper to CUNY Law Review for consideration. Last but not least I cannot
begin to thank CUNY Law Review editors Katherine Dennis and Sophie Cohen, and team
Alejo, for their commitment and enduring patience. The writing of this piece began at Otisville
Correctional Facility.
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available, as was gambling, and prostitution. It would be years before I
would hear the term “school-to-prison pipeline,” but once I did, I knew
for certain that it was more than just a catch phrase—we were its by-product.
While in prison, I was determined not to repeat the same behavior
that led me there. The first chance I had, I enrolled in college. Back then,
each joint had a college program: Attica had Genesee Community College, Auburn had Syracuse University, Sing Sing had New York Theological Seminary, and years later Eastern had the Bard Prison Initiative.
At Attica Correctional Facility, I worked in the metal shop during the day,
went to class at night, and on the weekends, after working out, I would
learn about Islam and politics in the yard with Muslims and Black Liberation Army political prisoners.
By the time I was able to count years instead of months spent in maximum security prisons, I had been moved around from Attica to Auburn
to Eastern to Sing Sing, and back to Eastern again. The moving around
process was a way to incentivize good behavior. I started out in one of the
most dangerous prisons in the nation and moved to facilities that provided
more program options so long as I was not a security threat. However,
unlike other states whose parole systems provide good behavior incentives to earn early parole considerations, in the state of New York, my
eighteen years to life sentence meant that I must serve every day of eighteen years before I could be considered eligible for parole. As I neared the
eighteen-year mark, I began to look at my achievements in preparation of
my first parole board hearing. I had acquired an associate’s degree, a
bachelor’s degree, a master’s degree, and eight years of American Sign
Language experience working with the Deaf and hearing impaired at
Eastern New York Correctional Facility. I had also facilitated the Alternative to Violence Project, received several Department of Corrections
and Community Supervision Commendable Behavior Reports, and was
fortunate to have a couple of poems published. 1
I made my first parole appearance in August 2003, at Eastern New
York Correctional Facility. I was forty-one years old. I had no idea what
to expect. I was anxious and nervous but also confident in the changes I
had made in my life. I knew I had to address the issues that put me in the
frame of mind where I lost compassion for another human being. I believed the changes I made reflected a commitment to atone. On the day I
actually appeared at the Board of Parole (“the Board”), I sat before two
commissioners and the hearing lasted over thirty minutes. I later learned
that a hearing which lasted for thirty minutes was practically unheard of.
1 For some of the author’s published poems, see Alejo Dao’ud Rodriguez, in DOING
TIME: TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF PRISON WRITING 222, 222-23 (Bell Gale Chevigny ed., 1999).
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I had asked around from people who I knew had been before the parole
board and overwhelmingly their experiences were that parole hearings
lasted fewer than ten minutes. 2
A day after the hearing, I received my decision. Parole denied. The
explanation for the denial amounted to the “nature of the crime.” In other
words, I was denied for the same reason I was convicted. No matter what
I did with my time in prison, the programs I participated in, my rehabilitative transformation, remorse and insight, it was all glossed over. The
essential questions of my present state of mind, or whether I was suitable
for release didn’t seem to matter. I was denied and rescheduled to appear
twenty-four months later.
I sought to appeal the Board’s decision. With no money for an attorney I became a regular at the prison law library. I had no knowledge of
the parole appeal process and getting an entry level understanding consumed practically all of twenty-four months. My appeal went nowhere
and all I could do was start preparing for my next appearance. That 2005
parole board appearance resulted in another “nature of the crime” denial.
I was again denied parole in 2007, but by then I had become familiar with
navigating my way through the parole appeal process and in 2008 I received notice that the Board decided to grant me a new hearing based on
the merits of my appeal. In that appeal, I argued that the Board’s decision
to deny parole relied solely on the nature of the crime, and that three consecutive denials based on the same factor that was considered at sentencing was evidence that the Board’s decision was a foregone conclusion.
The fact that the Board’s Administrative Appeals Unit decided to grant
me a new hearing gave me a revived sense of hope. It was a hope that was
short lived. In the summer of 2008, I was again denied parole for the same
reason. It would be a process that would repeat itself in 2009, 2011, 2013,
and 2015. Each denial determination was a new arbitrary version of the
previous one.
However, in February 2016 an Orange County Supreme Court Judge
ruled in favor of my 2015 appeal on the arbitrary nature of the Board’s
decision to deny me parole and ordered a new hearing. I reappeared before
the Board on April 22, 2016, and to my surprise, I was again denied parole. I could not count the times I would second-guess myself as a result
of those parole hearings and their outcomes. I could not count the times
that I wondered if I had just said this instead of that then maybe that would
have made a difference. Or the times when I would hear that someone
else had received a “release to parole” decision and I would find myself
See Michael Winerip et al., For Blacks Facing Parole in New York State, Signs of a
Broken System, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2016), https://perma.cc/CQ2Q-P372, for reporting on the
insufficient length of parole hearings.
2
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fighting against feelings of resentment. There was a part of me that
wanted to be genuinely happy for others, but the Board’s decisions
seemed so random that it became difficult to even look at the release of
someone else as a silver-lining of hope. I hated seeing this trait in myself
and I hated it more when I saw traces of it mirrored in others around me—
a sort of detached indifference—in the halls and mess halls, gyms and law
libraries, in prison yards, and facility clinics where mental stress shows
up in physical infirmities.
The haunting reality of the effects of ongoing parole denials brought
me to a crossroad: either I succumb to the promise of despair or I look for
a way out. I chose the latter. Besides taking on my own legal parole appeal
battles, I took the law library’s legal research course which allowed me to
work in the law library with others who were appealing their parole decisions. I also began to involve myself more in restorative-justice-type activities and community-building programs, 3 and tried to keep pace with
mounting studies on incarceration that began to gain wider social attention within the last twenty or so years. As my time continued to extend
beyond twenty, twenty-five, and into thirty years, I began to uncover insights into the nature of parole in relation to what I was entitled. Namely,
that there is no constitutional right to be paroled 4 and that according to
the laws of the State of New York, the Board of Parole has significant
discretionary authority in making parole release decisions. 5 It is a power
that not even the courts can interrupt. 6
WHAT I SAW / MY PRELIMINARY RESEARCH
The stress alone of having to endure what I began to see as arbitrary
parole denials prompted me to try to make heads or tails of the process. I
3 Some of the activities that I participated in were the Alternative to Violence Project
where I was the Coordinator from 2007-2011 at Arthur Kill Correctional Facility. I also participated in the Network Support Services as the Resident Coordinator from 2012-2015 at the
Otisville Correctional Facility. From 2012 to 2016, I was the Co-Facilitator of the Otisville
Correctional Facility’s Lifers and Long-Termers Organization’s Reconciliation Workshop.
4 Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979) (“There is
no constitutional or inherent right of a convicted person to be conditionally released before
the expiration of a valid sentence.”).
5 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i(5) (McKinney 2019) (“Any action by the board or by a hearing officer pursuant to this article shall be deemed a judicial function and shall not be reviewable if done in accordance with law.”).
6 See Russo v. N.Y. State Bd. of Parole, 50 N.Y.2d 69, 75 (1980) (“[W]here a court fails
to impose an [Minimum Period of Imprisonment (MPI)], the Parole Board shall do so in accordance with its promulgated guidelines, or shall issue a written explanation of its reasons
for departing from the guidelines. The law contains no restriction limiting the Parole Board to
an MPI which a court could have imposed or requiring that the board establish an MPI of less
than the full sentence.”).
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dove into law books and legal commentaries to understand the world of
parole as it existed in New York. Through my initial legal research I
learned that between 1980 and 2011, the Board of Parole had been operating under the authority of a statute that was fundamentally altered.7 My
next lesson came by way of a rush of published texts on mass incarceration. 8 Most of these works, however, focused their criticisms on the War
on Drugs and fell short on any in-depth analysis of the plight of people
serving parole-eligible life sentences for violent crimes. Still, these texts
proved to be invaluable sources of information with accessible reference
points and innovative descriptions of the social policies, laws, prosecution
and prisons used as a means of social control of disadvantaged communities, which resulted in the advent of mass incarceration.
In recent years, significant reporting on parole has been published. 9
In July 2015, The Marshall Project published a report which highlighted
the absolute authority that parole boards wield:
[Parole] statutes are often vaguely worded, with language that is
easily sidestepped . . . And unlike politicians, who are bound by
open records and disclosure laws and are accountable to their constituents, parole boards often operate behind closed doors. Their
decisions are largely unreviewable by the courts – or anyone
else. 10
In December 2016, the New York Times reported on the existence of
racial discrimination in parole release decisions. 11 The article revealed
that a study of “thousands of parole decisions from the past several years
found that fewer than one in six [B]lack or Hispanic men was released at
EXEC. § 259-i(1), repealed by Budgets--Financial Services, ch. 62, § 38-f, 2011 N.Y.
Laws 611; see also Phillip M. Genty, Changes to Parole Laws Signal Potentially Sweeping
Policy Shift, N.Y.L.J. (Sept. 1, 2011) (“The 2011 amendments . . . repealed the troublesome
subdivision 1 of Section 259-i of the Executive Law, the section that had set out procedures
for conducting the obsolete function of setting minimum periods of imprisonment. This was
long overdue, given that the Parole Board has not had this responsibility since 1980.”).
8 These texts include, but are not limited to: MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW:
MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLINDNESS (2010); ANGELA Y. DAVIS, ARE
PRISONS OBSOLETE? (2003); ERNEST DRUCKER, A PLAGUE OF PRISONS: THE EPIDEMIOLOGY OF
MASS INCARCERATION IN AMERICA (2011); CHRISTIAN PARENTI, LOCKDOWN AMERICA: POLICE
AND PRISONS IN THE AGE OF CRISIS (1999).
9 See, e.g., Michelle Lewin & Nora Carroll, Collaborating Across the Walls: A Community Approach to Parole Justice, 20 CUNY L. REV. 249 (2017); PAROLE PREPARATION
PROJECT & THE RELEASE AGING PEOPLE IN PRISON CAMPAIGN, NEW YORK STATE PAROLE
BOARD: FAILURES IN STAFFING AND PERFORMANCE (2018), https://perma.cc/VVV4-98DD;
THE SENTENCING PROJECT, ANNUAL REPORT 2017 (2017), https://perma.cc/SW9B-BBEH.
10 Beth Schwartzapfel, Life Without Parole, THE MARSHALL PROJECT (July 10, 2015, 2:15
PM), https://perma.cc/2GZK-7V88.
11 Winerip et al., supra note 2.
7
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his first hearing, compared with one in four white men.” 12 The disparity
was found among people serving parole eligible sentences for small-time
property crimes. 13 However, among parole eligible individuals convicted
of a violent offense, the study found that “the board rarely released violent
offenders of any race, denying nearly ninety percent of them at their initial
interview.” 14
New York State does not have different parole laws for different categories of offenses. However, with a ninety percent rate of denial, there
is a different, unwritten standard for people who committed what would
be considered a violent crime. Unfortunately, while the New York Times
article highlighted systemic racial discrimination in parole decisions generally, it failed to address the Parole Board’s blatant discriminatory practices against people accused of violent felonies.
A call to action to address the existence of one form of discrimination, in this case racial discrimination, should never disqualify or minimize the existence of other forms of discrimination. Even more troubling
is that in the aftermath of the New York Times article nothing changed;
there were no official statements of accountability, no class action lawsuits against the Board’s discriminatory practices. Without a guaranteed
constitutional right to parole, these systemic abuses against a disadvantaged class of people will continue to resurface. I argue that in this current
time of our criminal justice history, the issue of granting constitutional
rights to people eligible for parole must be included in the discussion on
criminal justice reform.
ROADMAP
In Section I, I demonstrate how the backdrop of societal policies has
fueled the current era of mass incarceration. In Section II, I explain how
the U.S. Supreme Court case Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal
and Correctional Complex determined that people who are incarcerated
do not have a constitutional right to parole. In Section III, I argue why
this case was not intended to be precedent forty years later: Chief Justice
Burger noted in the majority opinion that the subject of parole was still
experimental because they did not know all the factors surrounding parole
at the time of the decision. We now know some of those factors that are

12

Id.
See id. (“It is a disparity that is particularly striking not for the most violent [offenders],
like rapists and murderers, but for small-time offenders who commit property crimes like
stealing a television from a house or shoplifting from Duane Reade—precisely the people
many states are now working to keep out of prison in the first place.”).
14 Id.
13
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relevant in New York State including that (i) the New York Board of Appeals abused their discretion in setting the Minimum Period of Incarceration; (ii) the New York State Board of Parole’s disproportionate denial
rates of parole against people convicted of violent offenses have less to
do with public safety and more to do with the federal financial incentives
offered to states to hold people convicted of violent offense in prison
longer; and (iii) that the Board of Parole did not write or implement legally mandated changes for over five years. Consequently, the Board of
Parole’s abusive practices have disadvantaged a class of people who
would otherwise be eligible for release to parole, and without any guaranteed constitutional rights to parole release, there will be ongoing governmental abuse of people in prison.
CONTEXTUALIZING THE ROLE OF MASS INCARCERATION IN SOCIETY

I.

The United States imprisons more people than any other country in
the world, 15 yet the sum total of mass incarceration cannot be defined
solely by the amount of people in prison. In order to get a full picture of
the role of mass incarceration in the United States, one must contextualize
the socio-political framework that created the system. Ernest Drucker, author of A Plague of Prisons, defined mass incarceration as a network of
policies and institutions that support large scale use of prisons for political
or social purposes in which to sustain social control over a class of people,
and which has little to do with law enforcement. 16 It is undeniable that
when we look at the boom of people in prison over the last forty years,
the enforcement of laws has disproportionately imprisoned those who are
identifiably African Americans and Latinos by race, and the working poor
by class. 17
While this may seem out-of-sync with the daily bombardment of
crimes in the media, the media has actually caused and perpetuated racial
biases among the public, including law enforcement, leading to a discriminatory administration of criminal justice. 18 As Michelle Alexander has
put it, “once a public consensus was constructed by political and media
Michelle Ye Hee Lee, Yes, U.S. Locks People Up at a Higher Rate than Any Other
Country, WASH. POST (July 7, 2015), https://perma.cc/2GYD-3LM6; AM. PSYCHOL. ASS’N,
INCARCERATION NATION (2014), https://www.apa.org/monitor/2014/10/incarceration [https://
perma.cc/4QBC-4WKW].
16 DRUCKER, supra note 8, at 40-41.
17 Id. at 44-45 (pointing out that that inner-city communities of color have become virtual
prison “feeder communities” which has resulted in a depletion of human capital); see also
DAVIS, supra note 8, at 113 (“[People of color and the poor] are sent to prison, not so much
because of the crimes they may have indeed committed, but largely because their communities
have been criminalized.”).
18 See ALEXANDER, supra note 8, at 104-05.
15
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elites that drug crime is black and brown . . . . an extraordinarily high risk
of racial bias in the administration of criminal justice was present, given
the way in which all crime had been framed in the media and in political
discourse.” 19 Alexander recognizes “[t]he stark and sobering reality is
that, for reasons largely unrelated to actual crime trends, the American
penal system has emerged as a system of social control unparalleled in
world history.” 20 This obscure yet underlying characteristic of mass incarceration points directly to an economic-stimulus initiative, better
known as the prison-industrial complex, intended to rescue numerous
economically depressed rural white working-class counties. 21
Alex Lichtenstein also emphasized the use of prisons as an economic-stimulus initiative:
When Ta-Nehisi Coates says that America’s bloated and enormously expensive dependence on imprisonment has created a
“social service program . . . for a whole class of people,” he hits
the nail on the head. Perhaps correctional expenditures—police,
courts, jails, prisons, halfway houses, parole offices, and all the
rest—are better classified as “welfare” expenditures. Mass incarceration is not just (or even mainly) a response to crime, but rather
a perverse form of social spending that uses state power to address
a host of social problems at the back end, from poverty to drug
addiction to misbehavior in school. These are problems that voters, taxpayers, and politicians—especially white voters, taxpayers, and politicians—seem unwilling to address in any other way.
And even as this spending exacts a toll on those it targets, it confers economic benefits on others, creating employment in white
rural areas, an enormous government-sponsored market in prison
supplies, and cheap labor for businesses. 22
This “enormous government-sponsored market” emerged as the
United States has proclaimed itself the champion of freedom and democracy, all the while holding the undisputed world title in the imprisonment

19 Id. at 107-08 (discussing the disproportionate featuring of African Americans in news
stories associated to drug crime, the racially charged “political rhetoric and media imagery
associated with the drug war” in news stories, and the “media bonanza inspired by the
[Reagan] administration’s campaign [that] solidified in the public imagination the image of
the black drug criminal.”). For more on the War on Drugs, and its impact on the media and on
the public’s conflation of crime and race, see id. at 104-09.
20 Id. at 8.
21 DAVIS, supra note 8, at 14-15; PARENTI, supra note 8, at 216-17.
22 Alex Lichtenstein, Mass Incarceration Has Become the New Welfare, THE ATLANTIC
(Sept. 16, 2015), https://perma.cc/DH82-2KRJ.
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of its citizens. 23 This contradiction has so pitted the U.S. against indefensible accusations of hypocrisy, that members of Congress on both sides
of the aisle have begun to acknowledge that the boom in prison populations came as a result of failed social policies.24 However, despite bipartisan disclosures and calls to withdraw front-end mandatory sentencing
guidelines that greatly contributed to the boom in the prison population,
little attention has been paid to back-end parole denials which have
equally helped to regulate prison population numbers during a time of
decreasing crime rates. 25 Kate Hatheway writes:
In the United States, where one of every nine people in prison is
serving a life sentence, and people of color and children constitute
nearly two-thirds and 6.5% of all lifers, respectively, changes to
parole are necessary not only to curb mass incarceration, but also
to help restore some semblance of equity and humanity to the
criminal justice system. 26
In New York State, the Board of Parole has complete discretionary
authority in making parole release determinations. 27 The law that governs
parole requires the Board to make the determination of whether someone
poses a risk to public safety. 28 If a person is denied parole, the Board is
required to explain its reasons for the denial in detail and in unambiguous
terms. 29 These elements, which are fundamental to the statutory criteria,
are the same for all parole applicants regardless of the category of their

Id.; see also Adam Liptak, Inmate Count in U.S. Dwarfs Other Nations’, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 23, 2008), https://perma.cc/3CMX-CRN3.
24 See Eduardo Porter, In the U.S., Punishment Comes Before the Crimes, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 29, 2014), https://perma.cc/4HNG-AWWM.
25 Kathy Boudin, Hope, Illusion and Imagination: The Politics of Parole and Reentry in
the Era of Mass Incarceration, 38 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 563, 565 (2014).
26 Kate Hatheway, Creating a Meaningful Opportunity for Review: Challenging the Politicization of Parole for Life-Sentenced Prisoners, 54 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 601, 604 (2017)
(citing ASHLEY NELLIS, SENTENCING PROJECT, LIFE GOES ON: THE HISTORIC RISE IN LIFE
SENTENCES IN AMERICA (2013)).
27 N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 259-i(2)(a)(i) (McKinney 2019) (“[A] member or members as determined by the rules of the board shall personally interview such [person who is incarcerated]
and determine whether he should be paroled . . . .”).
28 Id. at § 259-i(2)(c)(A) (“Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as
a reward for good conduct or efficient performance of duties while confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that . . . his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society . . . .”).
29 Id. at § 259-i(2)(a) (“If parole is not granted upon such review, the [person who is incarcerated] shall be informed in writing within two weeks of such appearance of the factors
and reasons for such denial of parole.”).
23
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offense. 30 So, why are people who committed violent offenses denied parole at a significantly higher percentage than people who committed nonviolent offenses?
Parole boards often rely on the serious nature of the offense when
denying parole to someone who committed a violent felony offense, as
they did in my case. And yet the nature of the crime was already considered by the sentencing court. The Board duplicates the same consideration
of the same factor, which bears no insight into a parole applicant’s present
level of rehabilitation and maturity. This circular approach to the parole
hearing process has generated great criticism from many proponents of
parole reform. 31 Dr. Kathy Boudin, Director of the Center for Justice at
Columbia University School of Social Work, observed that “parole denials do not appear to correlate with the issue of public safety. Parole denials
are part of a much larger system of mass incarceration that has evolved
over the past decades.” 32 Kate Hatheway also pointed out:
Even as crime rates have experienced periods of decline, the fact
that lifers are not being released has created a backlog in our prisons of people who no longer pose a threat to society. Between
1991 and 1997 alone, the average time served on a life sentence
increased by almost eight years, from 21.2 to twenty-nine years. 33
The findings of ongoing abuse against people serving parole eligible
life sentences prefaces and supports the claim for constitutionally protected rights to parole release. However, before entertaining a claim for
constitutional protection that has been previously denied, it would be advantageous to learn the reasons why.
EXAMINATION OF THE SUPREME COURT’S DECISION IN GREENHOLTZ

II.

In 1979, the United States Supreme Court addressed the question of
whether individuals in prison had a guaranteed right to be released on
parole in Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional

While N.Y. Exec. Law § 259-i(2)(a) does not explicitly state that the parole guidelines
are applied in the same way regardless of the individual’s conviction, the provision does not
provide a delineation based on category of conviction and instead refers to “an inmate” or “the
inmate” broadly. Id.
31 Beth Schwartzapfel, How Parole Boards Keep Prisoners in the Dark and Behind Bars,
WASH. POST (July 11, 2015), https://perma.cc/S36D-N6HM; Jarrett Murphy, Advocates Press
Albany to Fix New York’s Parole System, CITY LIMITS (Jan. 30, 2019), https://perma.cc/QD27DSLE; Victoria Law, New York’s Parole System Is ‘Broken,’ But Cuomo Can Help Fix It,
THE VILLAGE VOICE (June 5, 2017), https://perma.cc/V38P-5NYL.
32 Boudin, supra note 25, at 565.
33 Hatheway, supra note 26, at 603 (footnotes omitted).
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Complex. 34 The Supreme Court determined that states were under no obligation to incorporate parole as an incentive for early release into their
sentencing guidelines. 35 Thus, there was no constitutionally protected
guarantee that a person should have the right to be released on parole.36
The Court ruled that once a state adopts a parole system, individuals shall
be entitled to the rights of equal protection and due process in accordance
with the adopted system. 37
The significance of the Supreme Court’s ruling in Greenholtz stems
from a mounting dispute left in the wake of the Court’s 1972 ruling in
Morrissey v. Brewer. The issue in Morrissey was whether a person living
in society under parole supervision has constitutional protections against
having his or her parole revoked. 38 In Morrissey, the Supreme Court determined that people released from prison and living in society, i.e. working and paying taxes while serving the completion of their sentences on
parole, were entitled to constitutional protections against having their parole revoked. 39 However, in 1979 the Court distinguished its decision in
Greenholtz from Morrissey, because Greenholtz applied to people who
were incarcerated and who had not yet been paroled. 40
The Greenholtz Court’s departure from Morrissey revolved around
whether people in prison deserved the same guaranteed protections that
were afforded to people facing parole violations and reimprisonment, or
whether parole release determinations were no more than a privilege to
be offered at the discretion of parole boards. 41 However, in Greenholtz
the Court noted that “[t]he inmates here . . . are confined and thus subject
to all the necessary restraints that inhere in a prison.” 42 For the purposes
of due process requirements, the Court held that parolees in society and
people in prison hoping to make parole are not the same. 43 Consequently,
34 Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1 (1979). People who
were incarcerated and eligible for parole brought a class action suit against the Nebraska Penal
and Correctional Complex, arguing that the parole statute and the Board of Parole had denied
them of procedural due process.
35 Id. at 7 (“A state may . . . establish a parole system, but it has no duty to do so.”).
36 Id. (“There is no constitutional or inherent right of a [person who is incarcerated] to be
conditionally released before the expiration of a valid sentence.”).
37 Id. at 16 (“The Nebraska procedure affords an opportunity to be heard, and when parole
is denied it informs the inmate in what respects he falls short of qualifying for parole; this
affords the process that is due under these circumstances. The Constitution does not require
more.”).
38 Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 472 (1972).
39 Id. at 482-84.
40 Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 9.
41 Id. at 9-10.
42 Id. at 9.
43 Id. at 9-10. “There is a crucial distinction between being deprived of a liberty one has,
as in parole, and being denied a conditional liberty that one desires.” Id. at 9.

2019] THE OBSCURE LEGACY OF MASS INCARCERATION

45

the Court concluded that people who were incarcerated had “no constitutional or inherent right” to be paroled from prison. 44
The Court’s dissection of these intricate details in Greenholtz would
ultimately result in a decision of precedence which has been upheld for
the last forty years. However, as much as the nation would come to rely
on Greenholtz regarding questions of constitutionality in parole release
determinations, what is often overlooked is the fact that the Greenholtz
ruling did not come to be without significant controversy. For one thing,
Greenholtz was a highly contested matter with a ruling that was narrowly
determined by a tiebreaking five-to-four vote. 45
Among the dissenting Supreme Court Justices, Justice Powell found
that “[l]iberty from bodily restraint always has been recognized as the
core of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause from arbitrary
governmental action.” 46 Justice Powell further stated that “[f]rom the day
that he is sentenced in a State with a parole system, a prisoner justifiably
expects release on parole when he meets the standards of eligibility applicable within that system.” 47 Justice Powell reasoned that where there is a
justifiable expectation of parole, that expectation is deserving of constitutional protections. 48
Justice Thurgood Marshall also wrote a dissenting opinion, joined by
Justice Brennan and Justice Stevens. Justice Marshall wrote:
I must register my opinion that all prisoners potentially eligible
for parole have a liberty interest of which they may not be deprived without due process, regardless of the particular statutory
language that implements the parole system . . . . [W]hen a State
enacts a parole system, and creates the possibility of release from
incarceration upon satisfaction of certain conditions, it necessarily qualifies that initial deprivation. In my judgment, it is the
existence of this system which allows prison inmates to retain
their protected interest in securing freedoms available outside
prison. Because parole release proceedings clearly implicate this
retained liberty interest, the Fourteenth Amendment requires that
due process be observed, irrespective of the specific provisions in
the applicable parole statute.49

Id. at 7.
Id. at 18-40 (Justice Powell concurred in part and dissented in part, and Justice Marshall
dissented in part with Justices Brennan and Stevens joining).
46 Id. at 18 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
47 Id. at 20.
48 Id. at 19.
49 Id. at 22-23 (footnote omitted).
44
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These purposely articulated opinions influenced the majority to
acknowledge the lack of evidenced-based data necessary to support its
final determination. As the majority conceded, “the very institution of parole is still in an experimental stage” in which “few certainties exist.”50
Ultimately, this acknowledgment did not lead the majority to grant the
claim for constitutionally protected entitlement to parole release. However, in an unusual acknowledgment, the majority’s opinion emphasized
for a second time that “the whole question has been and will continue to
be the subject of experimentation.” 51 The majority’s continued use of the
word “experiment” suggests that the Justices were not wholly convinced
of the Court’s final determination.
III. THE GREENHOLTZ RULING WAS NEVER INTENDED TO BE A
HEADSTONE
As interpreters of the U.S. Constitution, the Supreme Court renders
opinions which are intentionally and purposefully worded. 52 Here, the
Court expressly stated that “the very institution of parole is still in an experimental stage” 53 and that parole-release decisions “will continue to be
the subject of experimentation.” 54 This emphasis cannot be overlooked
for two reasons. First, there is the doctrine of stare decisis to which the
Supreme Court is bound to adhere, and “the Constitution was intended—
its very purpose was—to prevent experimentation with the fundamental
rights of the individual.” 55
Second, even if we were to consider the Court’s description of parole
as a subject of experimentation and therefore not burdened by the doctrine
of stare decisis, the inherent requirement of the experimentation process—which involves a study of a controlled group, the monitoring of the
impact in changes of circumstances and a marked timeframe to assess results—is a methodology which further emphasizes that the Supreme
Court’s ruling in Greenholtz was never intended to be a headstone.

Id. at 8 (emphasis added).
Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
52 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases,
must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”).
53 Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 8.
54 Id. at 13.
55 Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312, 338 (1921). The doctrine of stare decisis requires the
Court to adhere to an established ruling on a matter or provide an explanation of its reasons
for departure therefrom. In Greenholtz, the bench not only deviated from precedent to affirm
a policy experiment over fundamental rights, but it also failed to explain its reason for this
departure.
50
51
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It has now been forty years since the Greenholtz ruling; an era of
failed social policies which marked the advent of mass incarceration that
directly and indirectly influenced an increase in parole denials to otherwise release-ready applicants. In recent years, state and federal policy
makers, historians, and political authors have acknowledged the harm
done to our society by the War on Drugs, the Violent Offender Incarceration and Truth-in-Sentencing (“VOI/TIS”) Incentive Grant Program, and
the reliance on incarceration as a means of addressing social problems.56
This acknowledgement has translated into renewed interest in policy reforms on sentencing guidelines, alternatives to incarceration, and increased emphasis on reentry support strategies. 57 Yet, little interest has
been expressed to equally address the influence that these same failed social policies had on increasing the percentage of parole denials. These
social policies that ushered in the era of mass incarceration were instituted
after the Greenholtz opinion became the established ruling of precedent.
We must consider whether there would have been a different Supreme
Court ruling in Greenholtz if the Court were aware of the ensuing changes
in social policies that, without any constitutional protections, would directly affect people’s chances to be paroled.
We must contextualize factors surrounding the Greenholtz ruling, including that it survived by a five to four margin and that the majority’s
opinion explicitly declared that parole was still the subject of experimentation. The burning question becomes whether the Greenholtz ruling has
outlived its shelf life. More importantly, can a new claim for constitutional protections be entertained once a previous claim has been denied?
According to the 2015 Supreme Court ruling in Obergefell v. Hodges,
when “interpreting the Equal Protection Clause, the court has recognized
that new insights and societal understandings can reveal unjustified inequality within our most fundamental institutions that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged.” 58
Obergefell also offers an explanation as to why the Court should hear
a new claim for constitutional protections after a previous claim had been
denied. In Obergefell, the Supreme Court entertained a new claim of constitutional rights to permit same-sex marriage which the Court had previously denied. 59 In the Court’s decision to hear a new claim, the Court
explained that “[i]f rights were defined by who exercised them in the past,

See Lichtenstein, supra note 22.
See, e.g., Alternatives to Incarceration (ATI) and Sentencing Reform, LEGAL ACTION
CENTER, https://perma.cc/W5MC-A2P2 (last visited Apr. 9, 2019).
58 Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2603 (2015) (emphasis added).
59 Id. at 2605 (overruling Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972)).
56
57
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then received [discriminatory] practices could serve as their own continued justification and new groups could not invoke rights once denied.”60
Here, the Supreme Court confirmed that in a society of evolving awareness of structural or institutional abuses, any effort to present new claims
of constitutional protections against such abuses cannot be turned down
simply because the Supreme Court previously denied a similar claim.
This theory, which allows new claims for constitutional protections
to be heard and considered in the face of new societal insights, is one of
the great beauties of the United States Constitution.
The generations that wrote and ratified the Bill of Rights and the
Fourteenth Amendment did not presume to know the extent of
freedom in all of its dimensions, and so they entrusted to future
generations a charter protecting the right of all persons to enjoy
liberty as we learn its meaning. When new insight reveals discord
between the Constitution’s central protections and a received legal stricture, a claim to liberty must be addressed. 61
Without this ability, the Supreme Court would be forced to uphold
the disenfranchisement of women, racial segregation, and, for that matter,
even the institution of slavery. Fortunately, this is not the case. Indeed,
the Supreme Court’s opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, which
found racial segregation in public schools unconstitutional, offered insight into the critical importance of taking changing societal circumstances into account when new claims for constitutional protections were
made. 62 In Brown, the Court acknowledged that “[w]e must consider public education in the light of its full development and its present place in
American life throughout the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools deprives these plaintiffs of the
equal protection of the laws.” 63
Although the issue in Brown was a matter that challenged racial segregation in public education, from this passage we also can see that the
Court did not merely observe the institutions of racial segregation and
public education as isolated pillars. Thus, there is a common theme that
the doctrine of stare decisis is not a locked door. 64 This reminds us that

Id. at 2602 (citing Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967); Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 566-67 (2003)).
61 Id. at 2598.
62 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954).
63 Id.
64 See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003) (citing Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S.
808, 828 (1991)) (“Stare decisis is not an inexorable command . . . .”).
60
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“[t]he Constitution is ‘intended to preserve practical and substantial
rights, not to maintain theories.’” 65
There must be substantial constitutional protections in parole decisions. The structural abuses we see today were not presented to the Court
in Greenholtz, and yet they have so prejudiced a class of otherwise parole
eligible people that a new claim for constitutional rights to parole must be
addressed. Illustrated here are three examples of structural abuses that
have directly impacted the New York State parole system.
A.

Minimum Periods of Imprisonment (MPI) Abuses

Until 1980, in addition to conducting parole board hearings, the
Board of Parole shared the duty of setting Minimum Periods of Imprisonment (“MPI”) with sentencing courts. 66 In other words, the sentencing
courts and the Board of Parole were both responsible for determining
when someone would be eligible for parole release consideration. However, in 1980, the N.Y. State Legislature amended Executive Law § 259i(1) to remove the shared responsibility of establishing MPIs from the
Board of Parole and did away with the unnecessary duplication of functions that the courts were better suited to handle at sentencing. 67
Columbia Law Professor Philip M. Genty explained the purpose of
this amendment in the New York Law Journal:
The purpose of this change was to eliminate unnecessary duplication of function between the Parole Board and the sentencing
courts. Senator Christopher Mega’s memorandum in support of
this change described the Parole Board’s power to set sentences
as “an irrational waste of taxpayer[] money as well as criminal
justice resources” and observed that “there is nothing on which
the Board’s decision can be based which was not before the court
at the time sentence was imposed . . . and most of these factors
consist of matters the court is better able to ascertain and evaluate
(e.g., seriousness of the offense, mitigating and aggravating factors, etc.).” 68
As a result, the Board of Parole’s responsibilities were regulated to
making parole release determinations. However, despite the 1980 amendments to Executive Law which stripped away the Board of Parole’s responsibility for setting MPI parole eligibility dates, the statute “stayed on
65 Faitoute Iron & Steel Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 514 (1942) (quoting
Davis v. Mills, 194 U.S. 451, 457 (1904)).
66 Genty, supra note 7 (citation omitted).
67 Id.
68 Id. (footnote omitted).
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the books, and the guidelines remained unchanged” until they were officially appealed in 2011. 69 Consequently, between 1980 and 2011, “the
Parole Board often [performed] as if it were still responsible for sentencing decisions – it simply re-examine[d] the underlying crime and criminal
history,” especially of people convicted of violent felonies, while neglecting any meaningful assessment of rehabilitative maturity at the time of a
person’s parole appearance. 70 The Board of Parole’s abuse of people applying for parole could have been averted if parole applicants were entitled to constitutional protections, because they would have had standing
to appeal.
B.

Violent Offender Incarceration / Truth-in-Sentencing Policies,
Resultant Mass Incarceration, and Greenholtz

The 1994 Violent Offender Incarceration (“VOI”) and Truth-in-Sentencing (“TIS”) Incentive Grant program officially marked the institutional implementation of a social policy which made way for mass incarceration. This policy also enabled the justification of Board of Parole
abuses and the exploitation of people serving sentences for violent offenses.
The policy push for incarceration as a means of social control
emerged during the right-wing campaign for the War on Drugs and
greater “tough on crime” policies of the 1980s.71 This campaign gained
momentum and materialized into the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which established the Violent Offender Incarceration and Truth-in-Sentencing (“VOI/TIS”) Incentive Grant Program. 72
The VOI/TIS incentives appealed to states to adopt federal determinate sentencing guidelines, which required that people who are incarcerated serve eighty-five percent of their maximum sentence. 73 The VOI/TIS
grants also provided financial incentives for states to incarcerate people
convicted of violent felonies sentenced to indeterminate sentences for
longer periods. 74 These incentives provided that a state would be eligible
69

Id.
Id.
71 For a comprehensive timeline on sentencing reform laws, see Arit John, A Timeline of
the Rise and Fall of ‘Tough on Crime’ Drug Sentencing, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 22, 2014),
https://perma.cc/A7ZC-U5RM.
72 Id.; OFFICE OF JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO CONGRESS:
VIOLENT OFFENDER INCARCERATION AND TRUTH-IN-SENTENCING INCENTIVE FORMULA GRANT
PROGRAM 1 (2012), https://perma.cc/SW2Y-XZ67 [hereinafter U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE REPORT
TO CONGRESS].
73 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 72, at 3.
74 Id. at 1 (“The VOI/TIS Program provided formula grants to states to build or expand
correctional facilities and jails to increase secure confinement space for violent offenders.”).
70
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for additional funding when it demonstrated that, among other things, “it
had increased . . . the average prison time actually served by Part 1 violent
offenders; or . . . the average percentage of a sentence served by persons
convicted of a Part 1 violent crime.” 75 This aspect of the VOI/TIS incentives was not intended to be applied retroactively. However, no protective
measures were put in place to prevent unpredictable and inconsistent enforcement in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process
Clause. 76
Without clear constitutionally protected due process guarantees, between the 1990s and 2001, the New York State Board of Parole denied
parole to individuals who were otherwise eligible for early release in order to secure VOI/TIS funding. New York State Assemblyman Jeffrion
L. Aubry and former Chairman of the Assembly Standing Committee on
Correction noted:
In the mid 1990’s [sic] fundamental fairness and truth in sentencing were hailed to be the hallmarks of democracy in sentencing
justifying the enactment of determinate sentencing for most violent offenders . . . . It was unforeseen and not intended that these
same hallmarks would be quietly subtracted from those who remain subject to indeterminate sentencing, which seems to have
been the side effect in light of the 50% reduction in parole board
releases for similar offenders since that time. Some might claim
that it is a fair use of the board of parole to retrospectively
lengthen the punitive phase of an indeterminate sentence imposed
upon certain offenders; however, this is not the purpose of the
board of parole nor should it be. 77
Truth-in-Sentencing incentives influenced the New York State
Board of Parole’s decision-making authority to “retrospectively lengthen
the punitive phase of an indeterminate sentence” by denying parole to
otherwise worthy candidates for release. 78

Id. at 2-3.
The void for vagueness doctrine is triggered when a statute or regulation “fails to provide even minimal guidelines to law enforcement, thereby allowing for unpredictable and inconsistent enforcement and prosecution, which violates the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause.” People v. Gabriel, 950 N.Y.S.2d 874, 883 (2012); see also Kolender v. Lawson,
461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983) (“[T]he void-for-vagueness doctrine requires that a penal statute
define the criminal offense with sufficient definiteness that ordinary people can understand
what conduct is prohibited and in a manner that does not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement.”).
77 Memorandum in Support of Legislation, Assemb. B. 7939, Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2011),
https://perma.cc/DTY4-AC5Q.
78 See id.
75
76
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New York State received $217,491,434 in VOI/TIS funding between
1996 and 2001. 79 According to the Bureau of Justice Assistance’s Report
to Congress, New York ranked third in the nation, behind California and
Florida, to receive the largest amount of VOI/TIS funding. 80 New York
primarily spent this funding on prison expansion projects. 81 Ironically,
this occurred during a marked decline in convictions that led to a decreased rate of prison growth. 82 With less people coming into prison, the
prisons had to increase the number of people incarcerated, and that resulted in a sharp increase of parole denials for people who were convicted
of violent crimes, from a forty-nine percent denial rate in 1994 to seventy
percent in 1997. 83
The issue of capricious political influence on parole denial determination decisions, especially against individuals who committed violent
crimes, was raised in Chan v. Travis in 2003. In this case, Chan argued
that then Governor George Pataki had publicly expressed his commitment
to prevent parole to anyone convicted of murder. 84 After weighing the
documented evidence presented by Chan, the Albany Supreme Court held
that the Board of Parole’s reliance on the nature of the crime to deny Chan
parole was the result of political influence and ordered the Board of Parole
to provide Chan a new hearing. 85 Subsequently, Chan was released and
the Albany Court’s determination was rendered moot. 86 With a blink of
an eye, the issue of political influence on the Board of Parole was closed
with Chan. This left thousands of others subjected to the Board of Parole’s
de facto discretionary practices, which were highly incentivized with
monetary compensation from the federal government.
Governor Pataki remained in office for three terms and, thanks to his
six Court of Appeals appointees, his “tough-on-crime” platform—which
amounted to nothing more than an assurance to maintain a criminal justice
status quo that had little to do with actual crime rates—long outlived his
U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE REPORT TO CONGRESS, supra note 72, at 21.
See id. at 5.
81 Id. at 21-22. New York’s prison expansion projects created an additional 4,950 beds.
Id. at 21.
82 John Pfaff, Bill Clinton Is Wrong About His Crime Bill. So Are the Protesters He Lectured., N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Apr. 12, 2016), https://perma.cc/8QD9-MTBT (“[New York’s]
prison populations began a 15-year decline before the six-year program was even over.”).
83 Chan v. Travis, N.Y.L.J. 1202538922640 (Sup. Ct. Albany Cty. 2003) (“[I]t is not seriously disputed that since 1995 there has been a sharp decline in parole release for [people
who have committed] violent felon[ies], from about fifty one percent in 1994 to thirty percent
in 1997.”).
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Chan v. Travis, 3 A.D.3d 820, 821 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004) (dismissing cross appeals
because the Board’s decision to subsequently grant Chan parole rendered the appeals moot).
79
80
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terms as governor. 87 What the status quo did was to ensure that it would
meet the eligibility for VOI/TIS federal funding and the grant’s “Carryover of appropriations,” 88 which provided that obligated funds “shall remain available until expended. Funds obligated, but subsequently unspent
and deobligated, may remain available . . . for any subsequent fiscal
year.” 89 This meant that once the state qualified for VOI/TIS awards, it
was not bound to immediately use the funds for one particular purpose.
This funding provided the perfect economic-stimulus package for the underemployed and rural economy of upstate New York, because it left the
playing field wide open for unrestricted governmental abuse.
Governor Andrew Cuomo acknowledged this unrestricted abuse in
his 2011 State of the State address, where he declared that “an incarceration program is not an employment program. If people need jobs, let’s get
people jobs. Don’t put other people in prison to give some people
jobs . . . . That’s not what this state is all about and that has to end this
session.” 90
But, it has not ended. 91 To roll back New York’s reliance on the
prison system is to also undermine its dependency on the prison industry,
health benefits, and pension plans for prison staff. Ultimately, the economic security of the prison-industrial complex is a costly factor that cannot be minimized. As Ernest Drucker has described:
Currently, the prison industry supports one full-time employee for
every one of the 2.3 million people behind bars. The scale of this
enormous “prison-industrial complex,” encompass[as] over five
thousand federal, state, and local prisons and jails . . . . With so

87 See Benjamin Pomerance, What “Tough on Crime” Looks Like: How George Pataki
Transformed the New York State Court of Appeals, 78 ALB. L. REV. 187, 192 (2015); see also
DON STEMEN, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE PRISON PARADOX: MORE INCARCERATION WILL NOT
MAKE US SAFER 1-2 (2017), https://perma.cc/5YWF-CR93 (“Overall, the increased use of incarceration through the 1990s accounted for between 6 and 25 percent of the total reduction
in crime rates . . . . [H]igher incarceration rates are not associated with lower violent crime
rates.”).
88 34 U.S.C. § 12108(b)(4) (2019).
89 Id.
90 Governor Andrew M. Cuomo, State of the State Address (Jan. 5, 2011) (transcript
available at https://perma.cc/FW7D-55TN).
91 Due to a decline in new commitments to the New York state prison population, Governor Cuomo closed seven New York correctional facilities in 2011, including Arthur Kill,
Fulton, Mid-Orange, Oneida, Buffalo Work Release, Camp Georgetown and Summit Shock.
However, the practices of the Board of Parole remained unbridled. Press Release, Governor
Andrew M. Cuomo, Governor Cuomo Announces Closure of Seven State Prison Facilities
(June 30, 2011), https://perma.cc/2TWR-UHXP.
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many vested interests in maintaining the prison-industrial complex, it is no wonder the system has become self-perpetuating. 92
Drucker’s description of the relative nature of the prison-industrial
complex and its inextricable connection to VOI/TIS funding gives depth
to understanding how mass incarceration has exploded with little to no
relation to crime and punishment.
C. 2011 Amendments - Where New Changes Produce the Same
Outcome
On April 1, 2011, the Division of Parole and the Department of Correctional Services merged to form the Department of Corrections and
Community Supervision. 93 The merger contained significant legislation
amending both Executive Law and Correctional Law (“2011 Amendments”), and directing the Board of Parole to:
Establish written procedures for its use in making parole decisions
as required by law. Such written procedures shall incorporate risk
and needs principles to measure the rehabilitation of persons appearing before the board, the likelihood of success of such persons
upon release, and assist members of the state board of parole in
determining which inmates may be released to parole supervision. 94
In October of 2011, then New York Chairwoman of the Board of
Parole Andrea W. Evans promulgated instructions to the Board of Parole
Commissioners regarding the new legislation. 95 Here, a section of instructions to commissioners illustrated the Board of Parole’s flippant attitude
toward implementing the new amendments: “This instrument [TAP]
which incorporates risk and needs principles, will provide a meaningful
measure of an inmate’s rehabilitation . . . . Please know that the standard
for assessing the appropriateness for release, as well as the statutory criteria you must consider has not changed through the aforementioned legislation.” 96

Drucker, supra note 8, at 45, 47.
Merger of Department of Correctional Services and Division of Parole, DEP’T OF
CORR. & CMTY. SUPERVISION (Apr. 2011), https://perma.cc/A84V-2KWC.
94 Ch. 62, § 259-c(4), 2011 N.Y. Laws 73.
95 Letter from Andrea W. Evans, Chairwoman of the Board of Parole, to Members of the
Board of Parole (Oct. 5, 2011), https://perma.cc/9K6Q-6ZJ7.
96 Id.
92
93

2019] THE OBSCURE LEGACY OF MASS INCARCERATION

55

This statement reflected the Board’s lack of commitment to meaningfully reforming the parole process. 97 Two years after the merger, the
Board of Parole still had not filed its new regulations with the Secretary
of State as required by the 2011 amendments. As such, the Board of Parole was conducting parole hearings in violation of the law. As one Columbia County, New York Supreme Court judge wrote, since “no written
procedures have been promulgated concerning how parole decisions
should be made, the legislative mandate has been ignored.” 98
However, a later Albany County Supreme Court decision appeared
to defend the Board of Parole.99 The Albany Supreme Court ruled that
“there is no indication that the change in the statute required respondent
to adopt a fixed guideline or policy which will determine the outcome of
cases before the Parole Board.” 100 However, by the end of 2013, Chairwoman Evans was removed from her position and on December 18, 2013,
the Board of Parole filed the Evans’ Memorandum with the Secretary of
State to meet the statutory rulemaking requirement. 101

97 The 2011 amendments were surrounded by general uncertainty about “why the statute
was changed and what the revision was supposed to achieve,” and because the amendments
were passed through an executive budget bill rather than an independent legislative initiative,
there was no “memo from a sponsoring lawmaker, no approval message from the governor”
documenting the legislative intent behind amending the parole process. John Caher, Effect of
Risk Assessment Rule on Parole Decisions is Unclear, N.Y.L.J. (Apr. 30, 2012, 12:00 AM),
https://perma.cc/4L5J-8NKY.
98 Morris v. N.Y. State Dep’t of Corr. & Cmty. Supervision, 40 Misc. 3d 226, 232 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 2013). In Morris, the court held that parole denials were unlawful because the parole
board was required to issue written regulations, and it did not, thereby violating the legislative
mandate. Id. The Appellate Division has held, however, that formal rule-making was not required and that parole denials were lawful. Montane v. Evans, 116 A.D.3d 197, 202 (N.Y.
App. Div. 2014). For additional information regarding the circumstances, see John Caher, No
Obligation Found in New Law to Revamp Parole Procedures, N.Y.L.J. (Mar. 14, 2014),
https://perma.cc/96G6-XLDR.
99 Partee v. Evans, 40 Misc. 3d 896, 905-06 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013). The court declined to
follow the rationale set forth in Morris that a failure to file written procedures with the Secretary of State renders a parole decision in violation of lawful procedure. Id. The court held that
the amendment to Executive Law § 259-c(4) cannot be considered a rule required to be filed
with the Secretary of State, because the amendment did not require the Board of Parole to
adopt a fixed guideline or policy which would determine the outcome of cases without regard
to other facts and circumstances relevant to the underlying regulatory scheme. Id. While the
amendment requires the Board to consider “future focused risk assessment analysis” rather
than “past focused rhetoric,” the underlying regulatory scheme still requires case by case analysis and is dependent on the Board’s “independent exercise of their professional judgment.”
Id. at 901, 907-08.
100 Id. at 905-06.
101 Parole Board Decision-Making, 35 N.Y. State Reg. 51, CCS-51-13-00013-P (proposed
Dec. 18, 2013), https://perma.cc/C99E-5X32.
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In the aftermath, Assemblymen Daniel O’Donnell and Kenneth P.
Zebrowski articulated strong disapproval of the Board of Parole’s proposed rules. The assemblymen stated:
We were extremely disappointed to see that the proposed rules
contain no substantive change to the working requirements of the
Parole Board. Indeed, they fail to achieve any change in the status
quo, much less the significant change envisioned at the time we
negotiated the amendments. . . . The amended statutes of 2011 do
not authorize or suggest additional factors but instead require a
change of procedure and a change of perspective on the part of
the Board. 102
Despite the robust debate and this emphatic explanation of legislative intent, it was not until September 28, 2016, under the leadership of
Chairwoman Tina M. Stanford, that the Board of Parole published their
proposed rules. 103 Although this amended version closely aligned itself
with the criteria set forth in expressed legislative intent, it took five years
and new leadership for the Board of Parole to finally adhere to the legislative mandates of Executive Law § 259-c(4). Activists predicted that the
Board of Parole would be reluctant to use a new risk and needs instrument
to replace their own methods. 104
In their study of the Oklahoma Probation and Parole System, criminologists Anne L. Schneider, Laurie H. Ervin, and Zoann Snyder-Joy observed: “The presumed effectiveness of these instruments in increasing
uniformity, effectiveness, or efficiency, may be undermined by implementation problems, including reluctance of professionals to permit quantitative systems to replace their professional judgments.” 105 In other
words, experts predicted that parole board members would be reluctant to
implement regulations that would replace their professional judgment,
and, for five years, the highest courts in New York State failed to enforce
102 Letter from Daniel O’Donnell, Chairperson, N.Y. Assemb. Standing Comm. on Corr.
& Kenneth P. Zebrowski, Assemb. Chair, Admin. Regulations Review Comm’n, to Terrence
X. Tracy, Counsel, N.Y. State Bd. of Parole (Jan. 21, 2014), https://perma.cc/R8JB-JQG4.
103 COMM. ON CORR., N.Y. STATE ASSEMB., ANNUAL REPORT 15 (2016). The 2016 proposed regulations placed “greater emphasis on evidence of rehabilitation and objective measurements of future risk, and less on past acts,” in addition to abandoning the previously followed guidelines that “focused exclusively on the nature of the underlying offense and
criminal history.” Jeremy Benjamin, Newly Proposed Parole Regulations, N.Y. STATE BAR
ASS’N (Oct. 21, 2016, 10:57 PM), https://perma.cc/E45X-X458.
104 See, e.g., Release Aging People in Prison (RAPP) Campaign, Public Comments to Proposed Parole Regulations Submitted by the Release Aging People in Prison (RAPP) Campaign
(Oct. 8, 2016), https://perma.cc/6Y2B-MTY2.
105 ANNE L. SCHNEIDER ET AL., IMPLEMENTATION OF QUANTITATIVE DECISION AIDS IN THE
OKLAHOMA PROBATION AND PAROLE SYSTEM, AND ATTITUDES TOWARD THEM 4 (1990).
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the proposed quantitative system, thus allowing this foreseeable prediction to happen. 106
The effect of the 2011 amendments to the New York parole laws and
the ensuing implementation problems demonstrate that “the very institution of parole is still in an experimental stage,” as articulated by the Court
in Greenholtz. The Supreme Court’s notation of an experiment within its
Greenholtz ruling must not be ignored. Indeed, the very nature of the experimentation process demands that the legislatures use the scientific
method to assess the changes in circumstances and the recording of findings in order to make evidence-based determinations. After nearly forty
years of the parole experiment, now is the time to assess new findings in
light of the many constitutional abuses against a defenseless class of people.
CONCLUSION
On December 21, 2018, President Donald Trump signed into law the
Formerly Incarcerated Reenter Society Transformed Safely Transitioning
Every Person Act (“FIRST STEP Act”).107 The bill will reduce mandatory
minimum sentencing guidelines and provide incentives to people in
prison to participate in evidence-based reentry/recidivism prevention programs in preparation for their release. 108 However, the FIRST STEP Act
is a bill that is only prescribed for the federal prison system, and it excludes individuals who have been convicted of a violent crime.109 This
illustrates that people who have been convicted of a violent crime are not
only disadvantaged at the state level, but are further excluded from federal
protections.
The policies which gave rise to the era of mass incarceration were
not limited solely to the discriminatory arrest practices via the War on
See Linares v. Evans, 26 N.Y.3d 1012, 1013-14 (2015) (declining to consider Mr. Linares’ arguments regarding the validity of the new regulations addressing risks and needs assessments, and finding that the Board should have the first opportunity to evaluate the validity
and application of the new regulations); see also Lewin & Carroll, supra note 9, at 275-79
(discussing the litigation surrounding the 2011 amendments, including Mr. Linares’ case, and
the subsequent regulations).
107 First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, 132 Stat. 5194 (codified in scattered sections of 18, 21, 34, 42, 434 U.S.C.).
108 German Lopez, The First Step Act, Explained, VOX (Feb. 5, 2019, 9:42 PM),
https://perma.cc/6UYH-Y63Q (“The law allows inmates to get ‘earned time credits’ by participating in more vocational and rehabilitative programs. Those credits will allow them to be
released early to halfway houses or home confinement. Not only could this mitigate prison
overcrowding, but the hope is that the education programs will reduce the likelihood that an
inmate will commit another crime once released and, as a result, reduce both crime and incarceration in the long term.”).
109 See id.
106
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Drugs and mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines. De facto parole
policies and subsequent increased rates of parole denials of people who
were convicted of a violent crime, and who are otherwise eligible for parole, also have contributed to the backlog of people in prison. As indicated
in the introduction, “parole denials do not appear to correlate with the
issue of public safety. Parole denials are part of a much larger system of
mass incarceration that has evolved over the past decades.” 110 The late
Mujahid Farid, Lead Organizer of the Release Aging People in Prison
(“RAPP”) Campaign, also wrote:
The crisis within parole and other prison release mechanisms in
New York State has been mounting for the past 25 years. Back in
the early 1990s, these systems became co-opted by an encroaching punishment paradigm spreading across the United States . . . .
Consequently, a process commenced of routinely denying parole
and release applications . . . . This was especially the case with
those who had been convicted of serious or violent offenses.
Accordingly, this failure on the back-end release valve of the
criminal justice system arguably played a major role in ushering
in mass incarceration. 111
Unfortunately, attempts to prevent ongoing systemic abuse in parole
by making a claim for constitutional protection have been impeded by the
precedent of Greenholtz. 112 However, the Greenholtz ruling determined
that “the very institution of parole is still in an experimental stage” in
which “few certainties exist.” 113 There is reason to believe that this landmark case was never intended to be a permanent fixture. In other words,
simply because a constitutional claim has been denied before does not
mean that all future claims must also be denied.
The Supreme Court in Obergefell v. Hodges echoed its rationale in
Brown v. Board of Education, directing that when “interpreting the Equal
Boudin, supra note 25, at 565.
RELEASE AGING PEOPLE IN PRISON (RAPP), A BY-PRODUCT OF MASS INCARCERATION:
NEW YORK’S PAROLE SYSTEM IN NEED OF REPAIR 1 (2016), https://perma.cc/2WEP-PRPN.
112 See, e.g., Conn. Bd. of Pardons v. Dumschat, 452 U.S. 458, 464 (1981) (“Greenholtz
therefore compels the conclusion that an inmate has ‘no constitutional or inherent right’ to
commutation of his sentence.”); Artway v. Pallone, 672 F.2d 1168, 1179 (3d Cir. 1982) (citing
Greenholtz v. Inmates of Neb. Penal Corr. Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979)) (“A sex offender
such as plaintiff has no right to parole . . . prior to the expiration of the 20-year maximum term
specified for the crime of sodomy.”); Kohler v. Armstrong, No. 93-17003, 1994 WL 259755,
at *2 (9th Cir. June 14, 1994) (holding that plaintiff had no protected liberty interest in parole);
Pruitt v. Heimgartner, No. 15–3118, 620 Fed.Appx. 653, 661 (10th Cir. Aug. 6, 2015) (citing
Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7) (denying petitioner’s claim that he was deprived of his liberty interest in being considered for parole without due process).
113 Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 8 (emphasis added).
110
111
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Protection Clause . . . new insights and societal understandings” can give
rise to constitutional protections of a class of people that was not previously existent. In the contextual backdrop of today’s parole in New York,
failed social policies have led to the era of mass incarceration that did not
exist forty years ago when the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in Greenholtz.
Yet, Board of Parole abuses have so prejudiced people who have been
convicted of a violent offense that it underscores the need for constitutional protections in parole. Parole eligible people convicted of violent
crimes have been and continue to be disadvantaged in the parole consideration process, and Greenholtz must be reconsidered and reevaluated in
light of today’s knowledge.

